"Oh, German! I thought there was something wrong with you."

Beiträge zur England-Forschung

Band 68

Schriftenreihe des
Arbeitskreis **D**eutsche **E**ngland-**F**orschung
German Association for the Study of British History and Politics

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"Oh, German! I thought there was something wrong with you."

West Germany in British Perceptions, 1969-1975

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"Oh, German! I'm sorry, I thought there was something wrong with you."

Hotel owner Basil Fawlty (John Cleese) welcoming
West German guests to Fawlty Towers in 1975.

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Acknowledgements

Seeing or hearing the unexpected can be a most powerful experience in life. My first academic and for me surprising encounter with the wider problems discussed on these pages took place during my first term in a socio-linguistics class led by John J. Gumperz (University of California, Berkeley) at the University of Constance. National mentalities, he argued passionately, do not exist in the way most people think they do. He was convinced of the importance of different linguistic and non-verbal communicational codes that make intercultural life difficult. Over the years that followed I was taught by teachers with very different approaches and views who encouraged me to think about how we relate and how people in the past related to people from other nations. When I became a postgraduate student, Christoph Jahr (Humboldt University Berlin) acquainted me with research on historical attitudes between Britain and Germany. My stint at the Media Diversity Institute in London, my encounter with the academic and journalist Robert Leicht (Die Zeit) at a seminar in Prague, and the teachings of Patrick Evano at the Sorbonne all challenged my concept of the influence and history of the media. Robert Frank, my MA supervisor at the Sorbonne, encouraged me to write on European perceptions.

I am very grateful to Jan Palmowski (King's College London) for accepting me as his doctoral student and for tirelessly reading and commenting on previous drafts of this text. The ideas that he shared with me when I was developing my narrative have contributed immensely to the clarity of my argument. At a crucial early stage Stefan Berger (now at Ruhr University Bochum) gave his backing to my research project. Christian Fandrych (now at Leipzig University), Chris Thornhill (now at the University of Glasgow), Sandra Pott (now at the University of Stuttgart) and Thomas Müller (University of Münster) helped me shape the text with valuable advice. Charmian Brinson (Imperial College London) and Marianne Howarth (Nottingham Trent University), my examiners, kindly encouraged me to publish my work. Tamara Fathi and Niamh Campbell have taken the time to read everything. All errors and inaccuracies remain my own.

The student and doctoral scholarships of the *Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes* provided me with much intellectual inspiration over the years and also with the funds that only made my work possible. My first stay in England was generously funded by the German Academic Exchange Service. Those colleagues of different disciplines who have kindly pointed me to literature are mentioned in the footnotes.

I am indebted to the staff of the Labour History Archive in Manchester, the Conservative Party Archive and the personal papers sections of the

Introduction

As Europeans dealt with the burden of memory left by the Second World War, it became apparent that Western European integration was in many ways dependent on two states with a disharmonious, brutal and shared recent history, as well as – to date – contrasting levels of engagement with the integration project.

Great Britain had ended the war victorious, whilst the West German republic was now part of a defeated and divided nation. While Germany's history was a motivating factor in integration, and while a democratic West Germany lay at the centre of the European project, Britain remained notoriously reluctant to enter into the EC. Having been repeatedly refused entry in the 1960s, the country continued to be split on the issue of Europe even after it had joined the community, and remains so to the present day.

The late 1960s and early 1970s presented new economic, geopolitical and cultural contexts within which the British-German relationship evolved. In economic terms, the British economy declined relative to West Germany; as a result, the UK needed an economically vibrant Germany, and its access to the EC as one of its key members. Yet, playing a different role, Britain at the same time reasserted its occupation rights over Germany as a whole. New departures were made to make the Cold War world more hospitable. With the *Neue Ostpolitik* Willy Brandt was leading the way. How would Britain respond? It was an ambiguous situation for the British, not just in terms of power relations. Who were these post-war West Germans whom the British now had to trust? What did the British make of them?

In this book I will focus on a factor in the relationship between the two countries that accompanied all decisions without being the object of conscious political negotiations itself: perceptions of the national other. So far, there have been no systematic analyses of perceptions of Germany within the different spheres of British post-war society. Brechtken considers this lack "surprising" given the intense interest in British-German political relations by historians.[1] How were perceptions in 'high' politics and public opinion interrelated? What happened when memories of war evolved, when new generations born after 1945 came of age and new times favoured views that were opposed to the old ones? Frequently looking beyond the political and analysing different spheres of British society, this study intends to foster a more complex understanding of how different Britons oriented themselves in the post-war relationship.

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[1]   Magnus Brechtken, "Personality, Image and Perception: Patterns and Problems of Anglo-German Relations in the 19th and 20th Centuries," in *An Anglo-German Dialogue*, ed. Adolf M. Birke, Magnus Brechtken and Alaric Searle, 17 (Munich: K. G. Saur, 2000).

To what degree were people's perceptions shaped by the war and its aftermath? The tormented hotel owner Basil Fawlty in the British 1970s TV series *Fawlty Towers* embodies a confusing situation in a hightened way. Basil, not unlike the UK at the time, needs business; and when a group of new, coincidentally West German, guests enters his hotel lobby and misunderstandings start taking their course, "war" is still the most immediate connection that Basil makes. Throughout his conversation with the German party, Basil keeps trying hard not to mention what to him is the white elephant in the room.

Still, there is more to the otherness of the Germans in *Fawlty Towers*. When Basil says, "Oh, German! I'm sorry, I thought there was something wrong with you", he inadvertently offers a glimpse into another reflective process. Are these guests of sound mind? Are they like 'us'? Looking into the realm of public discourse and popular culture is crucial to add another dimension to British-German perceptions in this period.

The attention given in Britain to Germany over long periods of the 20th century is comparable in intensity to that given to countries like the USA and France.[2] British-German relations in the 20th century were structured by two world wars, fought on different sides; or rather, as Winston Churchill saw it, by a single "Thirty Years War".[3] The countries had long been divided by diverging political and economic histories yet had also been linked so very closely in many ways, notably through cultural and dynastic ties.[4]

This book focuses on two socio-professional networks in British 'high' politics - diplomats and politicians - and on British public opinion, aiming to establish a differentiated picture of British society, and concentrating on perceptions of West Germany, West Germans, and Germanness in the context of West Germany. In rare cases it includes perceived Germanness in the GDR, as well as in countries such as Austria and Switzerland, if the perceiving Briton's idea of Germanness expressly included and at the same time trascended West Germany. Analysing more would have been beyond

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[2]   Already in the 17th century English travellers are seen to compare France and Germany with each other, producing impressions which differ considerably from those of the latter half of the 20th century. French despotism and German religious tolerance of the post-1648 period figure prominently. David J. Sturdy, "Images of France and Germany: The Accounts of English Travellers in the Seventeenth Century," in *Deutschland und Frankreich in der frühen Neuzeit: Ancien Régime, Aufklärung und Revolution*, volume 12, ed. H. Durchhardt and E. Schmitt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1987).

[3]   Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Gathering Storm*, vol. 1, here the "Author's Preface," first paragraph, no page number (London: The Folio Society, 2000).

[4]   Peter Pulzer, *Fog in Channel: Anglo-German Perspectives in the Nineteenth Century*, Annual Lecture German Historical Institute 2000 (London: German Historical Institute, 2000) and Günter Hollenberg, *Englisches Interesse am Kaiserreich: Die Attraktivität Preußen-Deutschlands für konservative und liberale Kreise in Großbritannien* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1974).

the scope of this book and would arguably have blurred its focus. Sources very often focus exclusively on West Germany, apparently unaware of the existence of other Germans. Politically, the relationships between the UK and the GDR and the UK and the FRG, for instance, differed dramatically.[5] The UK only recognised the GDR as a state in 1972 in the wake of West German *Ostpolitik*; prior to this, there had been contacts between British nationals and 'East Germans', mainly of an economic nature, and among some Labour members and union representatives. Even after recognition, the number of encounters remained small, and did little to bring about the beginning of the official UK-GDR relationship. This relationship ultimately came into being as a result of (West German) *Ostpolitik*.[6]

Willy Brandt became West German Chancellor in 1969, a suitable year to start this analysis. The late 1960s and early 1970s were characterised by a number of potentially re-defining moments for the bilateral political relationship, including the second phase of West German *Ostpolitik*[7] with its treaties of Moscow and Warsaw, and British EC accession. New *Ostpolitik* had the potential to stir British fears of re-viving a perennial power-political problem in *Mitteleuropa*. At the same time, the late 1960s and early 1970s are remembered as years of social and political change, of a "revolution of consciousness",[8] in which a new dynamic in the European political system became recognisable, starting in the second half of the 1960s and ending, arguably, with the British referendum on Europe in 1975. The few studies which have already been published point to the scepticism British diplomatic representatives exhibited towards the new German policy.[9] What do we make of these fears? How do they fit into the range of British perceptions?

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[5]   On the relationship between the GDR and Britain see Stefan Berger, Norman LaPorte, *Friendly Enemies: Britain and the GDR, 1949-1990* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010). See also Marianne Howarth, *In Light and Shade*: *British Views of Germany since 1945* (PhD thesis, Nottingham Trent University 2000), 145.

[6]   Stefan Berger and Norman LaPorte, "Official Anti-Communism and What Lay beneath: The British Trade Unions and the 'Other' Germany 1949-1989," in *The Other Germany*, ed. S. Berger and N. LaPorte, 141-158 (Arbeitskreis Deutsche England-Forschung, Augsburg: Wißner-Verlag, 2005).

[7]   Gottfried Niedhart, "The British Reaction towards *Ostpolitik*: Anglo-West German Relations in the Era of Détente 1967-1971," in *Debating Foreign Affairs: The Public and British Foreign Policy since 1967*, ed. Christian Haase, 133 (Berlin, Vienna: Philo, 2003)**.**

[8]   Arnulf Baring, *Machtwechsel: Die Ära Brandt-Scheel*, in collaboration with Manfred Görtemaker (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1982), 197.

[9]   Roger Morgan, "Willy Brandt's *Neue Ostpolitik*: British Perceptions and Positions, 1969-1975," in Birke, Brechtken and Searle, 179-200; Anthony J. Nicholls, *Always Good Neighbours – Never Good Friends? Anglo-German Relations 1949-2001*, German Historical Institute, The 2004 Annual Lecture (London: GHI, 2005).

My study refers to a large number of political, cultural and sports events as prisms through which we can explore the thoughts and feelings that contributed to the relationships that the British built or imagined with West Germany at these moments, and not in the *Ereignisgeschichte* of the events themselves. Perceptions are not really a 'soft issue'; they influence relations just as much as economic, structural and other factors, yet often in ways which are difficult to determine. Proving their exact effect on actions is difficult, although this methodological problem does not diminish their significance. The methodological framework of this study will be set out in detail from page 27.

'Perception' is here understood as a complex process during which a representation of the environment is constructed in the perceiving person's mind. [10] Clearly, there is always some discrepancy between the subjective representation and the assumed objective texture of the world. The representation, however, helps the one who perceives to orientate himself/herself in the world. Crucially, the perceptual process not only entails interpreting the environment in all its diversity and contradiction, but already presupposes a subconscious selection. "Notions about national character", Anthony Nicholls wrote in 1997, "seem to have affected political decision-making", which "does make them an object of legitimate interest to historians". [11] A similar thinking leads to other historical publications on British-German relations such as those by Clemens[12] and the historical contributions in Emig. [13] I attempt to shed light on perceptions through a textual analysis of the sources, and by also looking at cultural, historical or other perceptions, while trying to find out more about unconsciously negotiated perceptual contents. I intend, as far as possible, to analyse the unconscious elements of perceptions as much as the conscious.

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[10] Parts of the multi-facetted, millenia-old epistemological discussion on perception, which started in philosophy can be left aside for the purposes of this study, since they bear no practical relevance for the analysis. For an overview see M. G. F. Martin's and Brian P. McLaughlin's articles on 'perception' in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 287-299.

[11] Anthony J. Nicholls, "The German 'National Character' in British Perspective," in *Conditions of Surrender: Britons and Germans Witness the End of the War*, ed. Ulrike Jordan, 26 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997).

[12] Detlef Clemens, *Herr Hitler in Germany: Wahrnehmung und Deutungen des Nationalsozialismus in Großbritannien 1920-1939* (Göttingen, Zürich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996).

[13] Rainer Emig, *Stereotypes in Contemporary Anglo-German Relations,* in association with Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000). Frank-Thomas Gräfe's book keeps its focus on state visits and links perceptions in new ways with the political history of West Germany. Frank-Thomas Gräfe, *Die deutsche Vergangenheit in der britischen Öffentlichkeit, Staatsbesuche und der Wandel des Deutschlandbildes in Großbritannien 1958 bis 1972*, Arbeitskreis deutsche Englandforschung, Band 61 (Augsburg: Wißner-Verlag 2009).

There has been a rich debate on the political and economic aspects of the British-German relationship. In light of this, the lack of literature with a focus on discussing perceptions within political, economic and cultural developments is striking.[14] Even more recent studies on post-war relations hardly deal with the issue of perceptions. [15] Authors focusing on perceptions frequently either choose an anecdotal approach towards 'stereotype research'[16] or use a narrow notion of perceptions and a subjective methodology, which makes their work difficult to evaluate.[17] In order for a historiography of binational relations to resist moving within the well known parameters of power and weakness, party politics, the individual politician or the diplomat and the structures which surround them, it needs to employ concepts developed outside the discipline of history, notably in political science, literary theory, and those of socio-psychologists.

Research on British-German relations generally has flourished since Paul Kennedy's seminal study on their deterioration between 1871 and the outbreak of the First World War.[18] His book focuses on the *longue durée* of British-German relations, arguing that changing economic factors during and after German unification led to the drifting apart of the two countries. However, Kennedy's book is not just about economic and political relations. Less noted by scholars is the importance it attaches to perceptions, even if its methodology fails to explicitly explain their formation.

As early as the 1960s, Donald Cameron Watt describes subjective factors as the biggest obstacles in British-West German relations in the

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[14] See for instance Sabine Lee, *Victory in Europe? Britain and Germany since 1945* (Harlow, London, New York: Pearson Education, 2001); K. Larres and E. Meehan, *Uneasy Allies: British-German Relations since 1945* (Oxford, New York: OUP, 2000); Gerhard A. Ritter and P. Wende, *Rivalität und Partnerschaft: Studien zu den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1999); Martin P. C. Schaad, *Bullying Bonn: Anglo-German Diplomacy on European Integration 1955-1961*, in association with St Antony's College (Oxford, Basingstoke, London: Macmillan Press, 2000). Also M. Maclean and J. Trouille, *France, Britain and Germany: Partners in a Changing World* (New York: Palgrave in association with the Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society, 2001).

[15] Lee dedicates two pages to perceptions of Germany immediately after the Second World War, focusing almost exclusively on the extreme views held by the British diplomat Vansittart.

[16] Thomas Kielinger, *Crossroads and Roundabouts: Junctions in German-British Relations* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1997); John Ramsden, *Don't Mention the War: The British and the Germans since 1890* (London: Little, Brown, 2006).

[17] Winfried Böttcher, *Deutschland aus britischer Sicht 1962-1972* (Wiesbaden, Frankfurt am Main, 1972).

[18] Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (London, Boston, Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1980).

post-1945 years.[19] Anthony Nicholls has more recently refocused this debate, asking, in 2004, whether the British and West Germans, following the Second World War, were "always good neighbours – never good friends".[20]

Karl Deutsch, who was one of the first to deal academically with the phenomenon of European integration, points to the relationship that links political endeavour with perceptions of the national "other". He notes that the durability of community integration relies on positive attitudes or affinities defined as

> "a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of 'we-feeling', trust, and mutual considera-tion; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior, and of cooperative action in accordance with it – in short, a mat-ter of perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making."[21]

Not only do attitudes have a purpose, Deutsch suggests, their formation may also adhere to a set of rules. In our context, his assumption indicates that, at a time of growing multilateral entanglement, a 'we-feeling' would have to develop over the course of years. Deutsch refers to this feeling as "other than verbal", and declares that without it no peaceful change, the main interest of his research, is possible.

As plausible as this may sound, Deutsch's theory has rarely been tested. One of the few attempts is Erik Jones and Niels van der Bijl's study on the approval or disapproval of EU states towards candidates for accession, which is based on Deutsch's reflections.[22] Jones and Niels aim to show numerically the degree to which countries with certain shared features (such as common religious majorities, shared historical experiences) support or do not support each other in practical politics.

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[19] Donald Cameron Watt, *England blickt auf Deutschland*, translation by Thomas M. Höpfner (Tübingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1965), 212.

[20] Nicholls, Always Good Neighbours. Detlef Nakath, "Die deutsch-deutschen Vertrags-verhandlungen und die Abstimmungen Bonns mit der britischen Regierung 1969 bis 1974," in *The Other Germany: Perceptions and Influences in British-East German Relations, 1945-1990*, ed. S. Berger and N. LaPorte, 61-74 (Augsburg: Wißner Verlag: 2005), mainly analyses West German actions and therefore does not consider British sources. His main argument is that there was a connection between British support for *Ostpolitik* and West German support for British EC accession.

[21] K. Deutsch, S. A. Burrell, R. A. Kahn, M. Lee Jr., M. Lichterman, R. E. Lindgren, F. L. Loewenheim and R. W. Wagenen, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: Interna-tional Organization in Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 36.

[22] Erik Jones, Niels van der Bijl, "Public Opinion and Enlargement: A Gravity Approach, European Union Politics," *Foreign and Security Policy, CEPS Working Documents*, March 2003. I should like to thank Gerald Schneider, University of Constance, for pointing me to this research.

Deutsch's hypothesis has also been explored in relation to another case in bilateral European post-war history. The German-French relationship constituted another problematic bi-national history in Western Europe. With regard to the evolution of German-French closeness - starting from a very bad moment of hereditary enmity in 1945 - Hartmut Kaelble observes that

> "in total not so much the immediate post-war years but rather the 1960s and 1970s marked a deep caesura. Only then the older generations with immediate war experience became slowly a minority and made room for younger generations whose experiences with the respective other country were no longer coined by war and war experience but by school exchanges, holiday and business trips, town twinning, French literature and movies and also through the every-day consumption of more goods than ever before from the respective other country. All these approaches and interconnections have for different reasons a historically unique quality."[23]

According to Kaelble, these changes took place in the 1960s and 1970s. Scholars of German history have begun to see the 1970s as a fundamental caesura, when the climate of the bloc confrontation began to change,[24] and a new phase of liberal globalisation began.[25] For Germany a series of developments came to a close in the 1970s; the influence of a generation whose political outlook had been shaped in the 1920s and 1930s, for instance, was now declining. Moreover, the oil price shock meant a crisis for the economy. These events potentially "marked the end of an age of extremes and the beginning of a period which still has not been named."[26] Was this caesura also noticeable in British perceptions of West Germany?

Many scholars of British-German history have been aware of perceptual questions; however, they have often failed to define a neat methodological framework for their studies.[27] Christopher Coker argues for instance that "[e]xplanations for Britain's opposition to European unity are essentially psychological, not political and certainly not economic." There exists in his terms a certain version of history "made for British

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[23]   Hartmut Kaelble, *Nachbarn am Rhein, Entfremdung und Annäherung der französischen und deutschen Gesellschaft seit 1880* (Munich: C H Beck, 1991), 244-245, my translation. See also Jürgen Krauskopf, *Das Deutschland- und Frankreichbild in Schulbüchern, Deutsche Französischbücher und französische Deutschbücher von 1950-1980*, Gießener Beiträge zur Fremdsprachendidaktik (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1985), 267: Krauskopf agrees that "in den siebziger Jahren setzt in beiden Ländern der entscheidende Wandel ein." Krauskopf also emphasises that the new picture of the 'other' is more sober but also more critical (268).

[24]   Anselm Doering-Manteuffel (ed.), *Strukturmerkmale der deutschen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts*: Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien 63 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006), 1.

[25]   Ibid., 9.

[26]   Ibid., 5-6, my translation.

[27]   See most recently Ramsden.

consumption".[28] This sounds sinister. Who provides such a version and to what end? Furthermore, why does it continue to be consumed if it is incorrect?

In 1965 Donald Cameron Watt wrote of the post-war period, "Lacking any positive leadership, British opinion has remained fixed in the stereotypes established in the two world wars." [29] His statement is, however, not sufficiently backed by sources. How did perceptions of the public and the perceptions within 'high politics' relate to each other?

Historians are in most cases not trained psychologists, and their reflections therefore rarely exceed the limits of popular psychology. Kettenacker, for instance, writes that "[t]he expansion of the image of the enemy during the war has taken deep roots in the collective psyche of Great Britain, so that it should even today not be underestimated in its significance for the British-German relationship." [30] Kettenacker talks about a "collective [British] psyche", yet one would reject the mysterious phrase "German soul" – a term used in nationalist self-description. Is the idea of a "collective psyche" more helpful as an analytical concept?

Working with dimensions like historical experiences, ideas and cultural research can also mean that the framework of references (such as the psychology of a people) remains unclear and the simplification of theories borrowed from other disciplines (eg historiography of mentalities) cannot truly shed light, since the observations lack detail; they often come with value judgment, such as the reproach of backwardness.[31] It is important to note that perception negotiations are not only understood as emotive, irrational, or absurd[32] processes, but as processes that can form part of or are intertwined with a "sober political assessment". This means that perception is not necessarily what Siegfried Kracauer called an obstacle impeding knowledge, in the sense that gaining knowledge would be less complicated without unrationalised perception.[33] Most of the time it is neither possible nor desirable for a historian to judge the validity of such perceptions. Should it not be our aim to attempt to lay bare the ideas

[28] Christopher Coker, *Who Only England Know: The Conservatives and Foreign Policy* (London: Alliance for the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1990), 25.

[29] Emig, 5, again quotes Watt's English edition of *England blickt auf Deutschland* (Donald Cameron Watt, *Britain Looks to Germany: British Opinion and Policy towards Germany since 1945* (London: Oswald Wolff, 1965), 114).

[30] Lothar Kettenacker, "Erziehung zum Frieden, Ein Hauptziel der britischen Deutschland-planung im Zweiten Weltkrieg," in *Großbritannien in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, ed. W. D. Gruner and B. Wendt, 207 (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. R. Krämer, 1994), my translation.

[31] Clemens A. Wurm, "Großbritannien und die westeuropäische Integration seit dem Zwei-ten Weltkrieg," in Gruner and Wendt, 226, my translation.

[32] Watt, England blickt auf Deutschland, 209.

[33] Cited in Klaus P. Hansen, *Kultur und Kulturwissenschaft* (Tübingen, Basle: Franke Verlag, 1995), 183. See also Hansen's discussion of the issue.

behind them, to analyse them carefully and to try to understand? This way we could better comprehend the mindset of a decision-maker, and thus make an important and original contribution to the understanding of political relations.

The flip side of accusing the British of having an out-dated view of the world is personal enthusiasm for British-German matters. Links between the authors's personal views and the object of their historical interests are difficult to avoid. Michael Howard, for instance, indicates that both countries naturally belong together. Their mutual enmity seems to be "unnatural and unnecessary; as a phenomenon which could have been avoided by a better leadership of the statesmen on both sides." Historians risk becoming part of the very discourse they aim to analyse.

A crucial question that has been raised in existing historical works is the problem of the historical development of perceptions. Joseph Canning writes that the first half of the 20th century **"was directly formative for so much of present day attitudes and pre-suppositions."[34] It is important to look at perceptions before the world wars and at their development during the wars to better understand the evolution of post-1945 perceptions.

Stereotype research in its cruder forms can sometimes adapt an a-historical air of the timeless, compiling a firm catalogue of adjectives. Such catalogues do not increase our knowledge to a significant degree. If one, for instance, defines a set of stereotypes of Germans in British eyes as comprising the adjectives "[o]rderly", "hard-working" and "complex",[35] this tells us very little of historical value. To learn more about the value perceptions have, how they are contextualised, which shape perceptions take and how they develop (what they do), we have to understand their evolution not as a conscious discussion about them but as a mainly subconscious absorption of the situation of the moment, of the history and of future expectations.

British-German perceptions, if analysed in greater detail, as by Kennedy or Böttcher, have predominantly been seen as the consciously presented impressions which the perceiving person has constructed of Germany. They have often been treated as a by-product of political analyses.

I will focus below on British perceptions of West Germany as expressed by senior diplomats and politicians, foremost in London, and also by English media and British TV. Amongst those it has been impossible to

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[34]   Joseph Canning, "Introduction," in *Present and Past: British Images of Germany in the First Half of the Twentieth Century and their Historical Legacy*, ed. Keith Robbins, 10 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 1999).

[35]   Catalogue re-printed in K. Herrmann, H. Husemann, L. Moyle, *Coping with the Relations: Anglo-German Cartoons from the Fifties to the Nineties*, *An Exhibition Organised by the Goethe-Institut London and the University of Osnabrück* (Osnabrück: Secolo Verlag, 1993), 15.

differentiate between English, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish voices, whilst an analysis of other British newspapers would have been beyond the scope of this book.

The first chapter poses the question of how perceptions relate to the pre- and post-Second World War history of British-West German relations, and will then critically reflect on a suitable methodology, mindful of the potential limitations of interdisciplinary approaches such as stereotype theory. In light of this, one part will explain the approach chosen for this study, which is perhaps best described as an analysis of 'negotiations of national perceptions'. This will become the framework for the analysis. The second and third chapters of the book analyse perceptions in 'high' politics, amongst diplomats at the Foreign Office and of politicians on the national stage respectively. The fourth chapter discusses and attempts a reconstruction of perceptions in the public and media.